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air in the late Fifties, but it was Kripkean articles’ merit to system-
atically introduce comprehensive devices and solutions. Later on,
the spreading of possible-worlds semantics massively changed the
approach to modal logic, which enormously increased in popularity
after that. Since Kripke’s work in modal logic is central to the devel-
opment of the discipline, the aim of this essay is to present the fun-
damental results published between 1959 and 1965. Indeed, it was
in such a brief and early phase of his career that Kripke was able to
conceive the main novelties that would become central to the sub-
sequent academic debates about modality. Here, their presentation
will follow the original historical progressive introduction. Particu-
lar attention will be given to the interconnection between articles,
their similarities in structure and the unified analysis produced by
means of them. It actually appears quite impressive that, already in
1959, Kripke seemed to have planned all the developments he would
present, one after the other, in the following years. First, an overview
of the background where Kripke’s ideas start to rise is given. Then,
each text’s results are individually briefly analysed.
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Introduction
The introduction of possible-worlds semantics completely revolutionised the
study of modal logic after their first appearances from 1958–1959 on. Indeed,
these, so-called, «marvellous years forpossibleworld semantics» (Copeland2002,
p. 131) paved the way to an increasing interest in the subject. Although at that
time some semantics for quantifiedmodal logics and correspondent complete-
ness proofs were being presented by other logicians,1 it was Kripke who offered
a unified tool to analyse different modal systems and to systematically obtain
connected results. The enormous popularity of his publications stimulated re-
markable steps forwards inmany related fields, both under a formal and aphilo-
sophical viewpoint.2
Given the well-recognized role of Kripke’s articles as a turning point in the
development of modern modal logic, the aim of the essay is to provide an or-
ganic historical reconstruction of the main results published between 1959 and
1965, by particularly focusing on the original sources and by emphasizing the
elements of novelty.3 An overall coherence and connection among his publica-
1Particularly remarkable are 1959 Bayart’s Henkin-style completeness proof for quantified S5
and, even more, Hintikka’s possible-worlds semantics and completeness proofs for quantified T
(Kripke’sM), S4 and S5, presented in a series of seminars held in the Boston area in 1958–1959 (un-
luckily, the notes of the talks are currently lost). Actually, «it is not clear which of the two [Hintikka
andKripke] was in fact the first to produce a fully worked out completeness proof (itmust have been
a matter of a fewmonths at most)» (Copeland 2002, p. 130).
2Considering, for example, the analysis of counterfactual conditionals, it seems that Prior (1968)
and Lewis (1973) proposals have hardly been conceived without the reception of Kripke’s semantics
(Stalnaker explicitly refers to Kripke’s work (Prior 1968, 103, fn. 6), while Lewis affirms to be inspired
by the success of possible-worlds semantics, thanks to which «[i]n the last dozen years or so, our un-
derstanding of modality has beenmuch improved» (Lewis 1973, p. 418)). Indeed, valuable observa-
tions about counterfactual statements have already been advanced by other authors (as Goodman)
but it was only by moving the analysis to possible-worlds context that many problems could have
been solved. On the other hand, the connection between some foundational problems in philoso-
phy of language or in metaphysics and modal logic is evident.
3The title ofmy essay is too ambitious in twoways. Indeed, in presenting (now standard) Kripke’s
theories, not all the facets of his modal logic are actually taken into account, due to the vastness of
the topic. First of all, my analysis is confined to Kripke’s early contributions about formal aspects
and, consequently, it is focused on a restricted period of time. Of course, Kripke’s philosophy is
much wider and other fields are inseparably related (see at least (Kripke 1972) and reflections con-
cerning “paradoxes of identity statements” and names of non-existing entities (Kripke 1963b) and
(Kripke 1971)). Although Seventies studies about metaphysics and philosophy of language seem to
have born and grown in strict relation to the formal ones, because of their complexity, I will avoid
to treat them, confining myself to technical logical aspects. This cut can be partially justified by
Kripke’s choice – between 1959 and 1965 – to omit, as much as possible, explicit philosophical in-
vestigations, see (Kripke 1959a, p. 2) (however, some interests in philosophical questions emerges in
(BarcanMarcus 1963b) and (Kripke 1963b)). Secondly, because philosophical issues cannot be pos-
sibly split from the «labyrinth full of twist and problems» (Fitting 1999, p. 105) of quantified modal
logic, which is the central topic of (Kripke 1963b), I have decided to mainly consider propositional
results and to simply outline the content of (ibid.) (while treating more in detail (Kripke 1959a)). It
must be stressed that some other - extremely relevant but very vast - topics have been completely
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tions has interestingly emerged. While many authors have introduced impor-
tant innovations and at the end of the Fifties other logicians are getting closer to
conceiving a relational semantics,4 what is striking in Kripke’s work is the uni-
tary and comprehensiveness of the analysis that, starting from a specific system
(quantified S5), is extended (with the necessary adjustments) tomany other log-
ics. Already in (Kripke 1959b), Kripke consciously planned to deal with all the
topics hewould debate in the following six years. In a certainway, his articles are
rather chapters or parts of a unique patchwork – aimed at systematically clari-
fying modal logic – and not individually-conceived products. Indeed, although
almost each paper can be read independently from the others, the author him-
self often emphasizes the link with previous and future works.
1 Overview
Formal modal logic enormously expanded during the Twentieth century. Mod-
ern interest in it was mainly revived by MacColl’s series of articles published in
Mind from 1880 on and, even more, by C.I. Lewis’ publications as starting from
1918. Both authors express their dissatisfaction towards the common notion of
material implication.5 WhileMacColl does not propose formal definitions or ax-
iomatizations, Lewis begins to introduce various systems of strict implication.
In particular, in Appendix II of (Lewis and Langford 1932), he presents the five
axiomatic systems S1-S5, which rapidly become canonical in the subsequent
studies in modal logic.6 Lewis’ original axiomatization does not separate, re-
omitted; in particular, the relationship between Kripke’s and category-theoretic semantics has not
been treated at all.
4In 1946, Carnap proposed a possible-world semantics for quantified S5, based on the idea of
state-description. In 1947 McKinsey and Tarski gave algebraic characterization for S4 and S5, while
the work of Jonsson and Tarski is described by Kripke as the (unaware, see (Copeland 2002, p. 105))
«most surprising anticipation» (Kripke 1963a) of his own (the so-called, “algebraic tradition”). The
importance of Kanger’s contribute is debated, see (Copeland 2002, pp. 122-123). Hintikka also
stated, without proving, soundness and completeness for T, B, S4 and S5 (Kripke quotes Hintikka’s
research in (Kripke 1959b, p. 324); (Kripke 1963a, 69, fn. 2) and (Kripke 1963b, 83, fn. 1); Hintikka
maybe gave some completeness results during Boston seminars). In 1955 Smiley established com-
pleteness forM. In 1959 Bayart published in French, a Henkin-style completeness proof for S5.
5In Symbolical Reasoning (1897),MacColl claims that P ⊃Qand¬P∨Qare not equivalent and he
distinguishes between extensional and intensional readings of the connectives. However, his texts
were not particularly popular (probably because of Russell’s wrong interpretation and consequent
critique). Anyway, he influences C.I. Lewis, who, in 1912, criticizes Russell and Whitehead’s notion
of material implication. The so-called “paradoxes” should show its inadequacy to represent the ac-
tual and ordinary meaning of implication. Thus, in a series of subsequent articles, Lewis proposes
different axiomatic systems of strict implication.
6More precisely, Lewis alone wrote Appendix II (but he acknowledges his debts to other authors
in (Lewis and Langford 1932, 492, fn. 1)). The systems are numbered in order of strength andweaker
systems are contained in stronger ones: S1 consists of axioms B1-B7, S2 adds B8 to S1 (both have
been already presented in Ch. 6), S3 corresponds to A1-A8 (also (Lewis 1918) system), S4 contains
B1-B7 and C10, S5 contains B1-B7 and C11 (ivi, pp. 500-501).
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spectively, propositional and modal axioms and rules. This improved presen-
tation – then standard – was first introduced for S4 by Gödel in the short note
in 1933, (Gödel 1933).7 Differently from (Lewis and Langford, 1932), Gödel opts
for necessity (B or N), rather than possibility, as primitive operator.8 Later on,
different presentations and formal systems widespread, such as Fays T (1937),
equivalent to von Wright M (1951), or Lemmon’s normal and non-normal sys-
tems. It is unlikely that without this “syntactic tradition” Kripke’s works would
have been conceived in the way they were. Furthermore, such a variety of sys-
tems lead a search for more rigorous interpretations of modal notions.
2 A Completeness Theorem inModal Logic (1959)
According to (Copeland 2002, p. 129), Kripke first becomes interested in modal
logics in 1956, after reading (Prior 1956). However, Kripke’s relational semantics
was not introduced all at once. The main goal of (Kripke 1959a), submitted in
1958 and published in 1959, is to present semantics and completeness theorem
for first-order S5 with equality. Most important novelties introduced are (1) the
notion of model as based on a domain D and constituted by a set K (conceiv-
able worlds) and by the actual world G and (2) the definition of the necessary
proposition as true in all possible worlds. The notion of validity is defined as
disconnected from the one of necessity. Although this apparatus is the basis for
subsequent semantics for systemsweaker than S5, many elements are stillmiss-
ing. Indeed, in 1959 neither accessibility relation nor separate valuation func-
tion appears. Moreover, in (Kripke 1963b) some elements are modified.9 S5*=
completeness proof is given by Beth’s semantical tableauxmethod. This fruitful
application of (Beth 1955) techniquewill be repeated (with somemodifications)
7In Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalkülus (presented in 1932 at the Vienna
Mathematical Colloquium and published in 1933), Gödel adds a provability operator B (“beweis-
bar”) to a propositional language in order to obtain an interpretation of Heyting’s intuitionistic cal-
culus as a logic of provability. He also observes that the given system G (propositional system plus
axioms T, K, and 4 and rule of necessitation) comes out to be equivalent to Lewis S4. The impor-
tance of (Gödel 1933) for future (Kripkean and not) developments in modal logic is dual: it intro-
duces the fruitful practice of axiomatizing systems by separating propositional andmodal parts and
it connects intuitionistic and modal logics. Actually, the idea of introducing a provability predicate
was probably suggested him by von Neumann in 1932 (this result was presented in Jan von Plato’s
“Gödel detective” course, University of Helsinki, 2017).
8Goldblatt (Goldblatt 2006, p. 6) notices that, before introducing the diamond operator in (Lewis
and Langford 1932), in (Lewis 1918, p. 292) Lewis employs the impossibility operator (∼) to define
strict implication. The box is devised by Fitch and it first appears in a 1946 paper of Barcan.
9In (Kripke 1959a) the model is defined in a domain D, while in (Kripke 1963b) the assignment
function ψ can assign different domains to different worlds of the same model. For Ballarin (Bal-
larin 2005), this change is related to a technical problem of 1959 semantics. Indeed, although Prior
seemed to have proved the Barcan formula and its converse for quantified S5, Kripke suggests that
they are not actually derivable (Kripke 1963b), but in (Kripke 1959a, p. 9) he has employed Prior’s
alleged results (see also (ivi, p. 10)).
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in themajority of the following articles. Despite the enormous success of this re-
sult, not all the passages of the proof are explicit and it sometimes lacks of rigour.
As already said, the propositional system was first introduced in (Lewis and
Langford 1932, p. 501). In 1959, Kripke adopts a quantified axiomatization for
first order predicate calculus with equality, taken from Rosser, supplemented
with modal axioms and rules of inference obtained from (Prior 1956):10
A1: A ⊃ A
A2: ¬A ⊃ ¬A
A3: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
R1: If `A and `A ⊃ B, then `B
R2: If `A, then ` A
Given a non-empty domain D and a formula A, a complete assignments for A
is defined as a function which assigns an element of D to every free individual
variable of A, either truth (T) or falsity (F) to every propositional variable of A and
a set of ordered n-tuples of members of D to every n-adic predicate variable. A
model ofA inD is anorderedpair (G,K),whereK is a set of complete assignments
for A inD,G ∈K, and everymember of K agrees withG on the assignment of free
individual variables of A. The intuitive meaning of this definition is presented
only later, in (Kripke 1959a, pp. 2-3). Being H a member of K, the evaluation of
H for a compound formula B is inductively defined in the usual way, apart from
the modal case: «B is assigned T if every member of K assigns T to B» (ibid. p.
2).
10Prior takes as the starting point Lewis S5 formulated by means of Gödel’s separation between
propositional and modal parts: «It has been shown by Gödel that a system equivalent to S5may be
obtained if we add to any complete basis for the classical propositional calculus a pair of symbols for
‘Necessarily’ and ‘Possibly’, which here will be ‘L’ and ‘M’, the axioms G1. CLCpqCLpLq, G2. CLpp,
G3. CNLpLNLp; the rule RL: If α is a thesis, so is Lα; and the definition Df. M :M =NLN» (Prior 1956,
p. 60). Actually, G1 corresponds toKripke’s (1959) A3 (now-called axiomK)written inPolishnotation;
G2 to A1 (T) and G3 is A2 (E). However, differently from what Prior seems to argue, this is not the
axiomatic system presented in (Gödel 1933). Indeed, the Gödelian 1933 system G corresponds to
S4, not to S5 (Gödel’s 1 (Bp ⊃ p) corresponds to T, 2 (Bp ⊃ .B(p ⊃ q) ⊃ Bq) to K, and 3 (Bp ⊃ BBp)
to 4). In fact, Prior quote Gödel’s text only indirectly, as «cited in R. Feys, Les systemes formalises des
modalities aristotéliciennes [. . . ] 16.1-16.24» (Prior 1956, 60, fn. 2). In (Feys 1950), Feys presents S5
subsequently to S4: «16.1 Le système de postulats suivants (Gödel) est un système postulats pour S4
[. . . ] 16.14 :: C Lp LLp. 16.2 Le système obtenu en replaçant le postulat 16.14 par 16.24 ci-dessous est
un systèmedepostulats pour S5. 16.24 :: CNLpLNLp» (ibid, pp. 499-500). Clearly, Feys’ 16.12, 16.13,
16.24 corresponds, respectively, to Prior’s G2, G1 and G3. It is likely that the direct source of Prior
for S5 is (Feys 1950) and that he did not consult (Gödel 1933), where S5 is absent (the first English
translation of it seems to be (Hintikka 1969), see (Dawson 1983)). It is possible that, in reading the
secondary French source, Prior attributed both systems (introduced one after the other) to Gödel,
without guessing that the substitution of 16.14with 16.24 to obtain S5was not another «système de
postulats suivants (Gödel)», but an axiomatization provided by Feys himself.
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Furthermore, various notions of validity are introduced. A formula A is said
to be valid in amodel (G,K) of A inD iff A is assigned T by G.11 It is satisfiable in
D iff there is somemodel of A inD in which A is valid. It is valid inD iff A is valid
in every model of A in D. A is universally valid iff A is valid in every non-empty
domain. These definitions are required for the completeness proof.
The central concept of the intuitive interpretation is the notion of “possible
world” (which is not further analysed). Because inmodal logic «wewish to know
notonly about the realworldbut aboutother conceivableworlds» (Kripke1959a,
p. 3), Kripke introducesmodels (G, K) as composed, not by a single assignment
but by a set (K) of assignments, one of which (G) represents the actual world,
and the others embody all the possible ones. Moreover, because, intuitively, a
proposition is necessary iff it is true in all conceivable situations, it naturally fol-
lows that B is defined as true iff B is true in all Ks. Coherently, a proposition is
true in the actual world if it is assigned T by G.
After giving possible-worlds semantics for S5*=, Kripke presents his com-
pleteness proof. He employs an adaptation to modal logic of the method of se-
mantical tableaux introduced by (Beth 1955). A semantical tableau is «a device
for testingwhether or not a given formula is semantically entailed by other given
formulas» (Kripke 1959a, p. 3) and a formula B is semantically entailed by a set
of formulas A1, . . . , An iff A1 & . . .& An ⊃ B is universally valid. Consequently, A1,
. . . , An do not entail B in case there is a model in which A1, . . . , An are true and
B is not. This situation is represented by a tableau with A1 & . . .& An in the left
column and B in the right one. Then, the «test of semantical entailment» (Negri
2009, p. 239) proceeds as a systematic search for a countermodel, through the
construction of a system of alternative sets of tableaux: the main tableau and
the auxiliary tableaux. The construction is produced by applying usual Beth’s
rules supplemented by twomodal rules, called Yl and Yr.12 A tableau is closed iff
either a formula occurs in both its columns or, for some a , a = a occurs in the
right column. A set of tableaux is closed iff one of its tableaux is closed.
Then, Kripke establishes a series of proofs in order to obtain, only at the end,
completeness for S5*= (Theorem 7): `A in S5*= iff A is universally valid. This re-
sult is obtained by summing Theorem 5 (completeness: if A is universally valid,
then `A inS5*=) andTheorem6 (validity: if `A inS5*=, thenA isuniversally valid).
Both of them require previous proof of Theorem 1, which states that B is seman-
11The terminological choice is not particularly satisfying, indeed, in (Kripke 1963a, p. 69, Kripke
substitutes the analogousdefinition for this propositional notionof “validity in amodel”, with “truth
in a model”. This second choice, which for Kripke is «clearly an improvement» (ivi, p. 70) and that I
will adopt from now on, is the one usually preferred in literature.
12See, (Kripke 1959a, p. 4). Kripkean rules are substantially the same as Beth’s ones but Kripke
presents two rules for each connective (left and right, with rule ∧r the tableau splits and there is nor
rule for Ir) and considers only negation, conjunction, universal quantifier and identity, whereas Beth
enumerates ten rules and more connectives are employed (Beth 1955, pp. 20-21).
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tically entailed by A1, . . . , An iff the construction beginning with A1 & . . .& An in
the left column and B in the right one is closed. It is proved by means of lemma
1 (if a construction beginning with A1 & .. .& An on the left and B on the right
is closed, then B is semantically entailed by A1, . . . , An)13 and lemma 2 (contra-
posedly to the “only if” part, if the construction beginning with A1 & . . .& An on
the left and B on the right is not closed, then B is not semantically entailed by
A1, . . . , An , so a countermodel can be found).14 After presenting Theorems 2 and
3, i.e. the «modal analogues of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem» [22, pp. 6-7],
and some other results, Kripke defines the characteristic formula of a particu-
lar stage of a given tableau as A1 & .. .& Am & ¬B1 & .. .¬Bn (where A1, . . . , & An
are the formulas on the left and B1, . . . , & Bn the ones on the right side at the
specific stage of the considered tableau). The subsequent Lemma 4 states that
if A is the characteristic formula of the initial stage of a construction, and B the
characteristic formula of any stage, then `A ⊃ B in S5*=. Finally, Kripke estab-
lishes completeness (Theorem 5) by Theorem 1 and Lemma 4: If A is universally
valid (so, by Theorem 1, the tableau construction beginning with A in the right
column is closed), then `A in S5*=. Subsequently he proofs validity (Theorem 6)
again by using Theorem 1.
Despite the success of the article, (Bayart 1966a) highlights a structural prob-
lem in Kripke’s completeness proof. Indeed, in both Theorem 1 and 7, «at each
step of the construction of a system of tableaux, several possibilities generally
occur so that different end results can be reached» (ivi, p. 277), e.g., a construc-
tion starting with bx and ¬bx in the left column and (x)bx in the right, can either
give a closed tableau (workingon¬bx) or anot closed tableau (workingon (x)bx).
Bayart suggests supplementing the procedure with a rule imposing a specific
choice at each step.15
After considering the variety of the logical systems (five distinct ones «pro-
posed in (Lewis and Langford 1932) alone» (Kripke 1959a, p. 13)), Kripke con-
cludes his paper announcing his intention to analyse them in a sequel. Thus,
even without introducing the definitive apparatus, already in 195816 he plans
to extend his semantical approach to obtain completeness for other modal sys-
tems. Indeed, in the same year, he publishes an abstract, (Kripke 1959b), where
13The proof is a reductio ad absurdum. Extremely roughly, if the construction is closed and we
assume that B is not semantically entailed by A1, . . . , An (i.e. there exists a non-empty domain D
and a model (G, K) such that A1 & . . .& An ⊃ B is not valid in (G, K)), then, because of the previously
defined tableaux rules, a contradiction follows (the same formula is both true and false in the same
model or a = a is false). For further details, see (Negri 2009).
14Roughly, for each non-closed construction, it is shown how to define a suitable countermodel,
say (G,K), such that – it is inductively proved – A1 & .. .& An are assigned T and B is assigned F (so A1
& .. .& An do not semantically entail B). See (Negri 2009). However, in (Kripke 1963a, p. 77), Kripke
partially emends this proof.
15An emended proof close to Kripke’s original one is presented in (Negri 2009, pp. 257-263).
16(Kripke 1959a)was receivedon the 25th of August 1958 (after Prior’s revision), but itwas probably
submitted in March, see (Goldblatt 2006, p. 35).
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he explicitly announces all the results of (at least) the subsequent six years. In
it he anticipates not only (Kripke 1963a) – where propositional systems weaker
thanS5aremodal-theoretically analysedand their completeness is established–
but also his following studies of non-normal systems (Kripke 1965b), quantified
extensions (Kripke 1963b), and intuitionistic semantics (Kripke 1965a). Interest-
ingly, Kripke quotes Hintikka’s preceding works about S4, S5 andM (while un-
derling the independence of its own results). Kripke also emphasizes the strict
connection between formal analyses (in particular of logics with identity) and
widespread issues in philosophy of language (point 3) (e.g. the morning star
paradox), which he will deepen during the Seventies.17
3 The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantifica-
tion Theory (1962)
The aim of (Kripke 1962) is to show the undecidability of a monadic fragment F
ofMQ, subsystemof S5*. This result is definedbyKripke as «prima facie surpris-
ing», considering thewell-knowndecidability of themonadic predicate calculus
for first order logic.
First of all, KripkepresentsMQ.18 Acquaintancewith (Kripke 1959a) is explic-
itly presupposed. Then, the proof of the undecidability of F – fragment of MQ
consisting of monadic formulae in two predicate letters – is sketched. Kripke
shows how to reduce the decision problem for F to the one of first-order dyadic
predicate logic, which is known to be undecidabile. To do so, each closed for-
mula A of extensional dyadic predicate logic is associated to a closed formula A*
of F, such that A is valid iff A* is provable in F. Concretely, given any A contain-
ing just one dyadic predicate R(x,y), the correspondent modal formula A* in F
replaces R(x,y) with ^(P(x) & Q(y)). It is then established that (1) if A is a valid
formula of the dyadic theory, A* is provable inMQ and, conversely, (2) if A is not
valid, A* is not provable. Given that decision problem for extensional formulae
is reduced to the one of themonadic fragment ofMQ, Kripke can concludes that
«[s]ince the former decision problem is unsolvable, so is the latter» (ivi, p. 115).
After presenting some other modal results, Kripke ends the paper with the
general consideration that undecidability cannot be escaped by consideringmo
dal systems different from S5*: «it seems unlikely that there will be a reasonable
modal system in which some formal analogue of this argument could not be
17For furtherdetails, see (Kripke1959b, p. 324). Acknowledgmentof these topics, central in (Kripke
1971) and (Kripke 1972) is witnessed by Kripke’s participation at the Boston Colloquium for the Phi-
losophy of Science 1961/1962 (BarcanMarcus 1963b, 108ss.).
18Kripke definesMQ as a system such that: (1) the language is the same as S5* (actually, in (Kripke
1962) also ^ is used); (2) if A contains only &, ¬ and the universal quantifier and is valid, then it is
provable in MQ; (3) MQ contains the rule of substitution; (4) MQ is a subsystem of S5*.
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carried out. In the domain of modal logic, decidable monadic systems simply
do not arise» (ivi, p. 116) (mine italics). In this way, Kripke links formal results
to intuitive considerations. Moreover, future extensions of this analysis to intu-
itionistic predicate calculus are announced.19
4 SemanticalAnalysisofModalLogic I.NormalModal
Propositional Calculus (1963)
1959 semantics is inadequate for systems weaker than S5, so, in order to ex-
tend his proposal, two major novelties enter the stages, when, in 1963, Kripke
considers propositional systems T, B, S4 and S5: an accessibility relation be-
tween words and an external function φ, which assign value to variables rela-
tive to worlds (which are no longer complete assignments). Consequently, «the
“absolute” notion of possible world in (Kripke 1959a) (where every world was
possible relative to every other) gives way to relative notion, of one world be-
ing possible relative to another» (Kripke 1963a, p. 70). These innovations will be
applied to many other (quantified, intuitionistic, non-normal) logics.20 Despite
the changes, Kripke considers this semantical apparatus as a generalization of
1959 one (see, Kripke 1963a, p. 69) and his 1963 work as aimed «to extend the
[previous] results» (ivi, p. 67). Also the arrangement of the two articles is ex-
tremely similar. Furthermore, Kripke announces upcoming treatments of quan-
tificational and non-normal logics (the ones enumerated in (Kripke 1959b)). On
ce again, the link with previous and subsequent works is explicit.
The main goal of (Kripke 1963a) is the establishment of completeness for
the considered modal propositional systems (still by Beth’s method) and of the
correspondence between the characteristic axiom of each system and the spe-
cific frame property. In defining themodal propositional calculus (MPS), in §1,
Kripkepresents thedistinctionbetweennormal andnon-normal systems: anor-
mal calculus contains axiom schemes A1 and A3 and rules R1 and R2 are ad-
missible.21 Starting from the so-defined basicM, other normal systems are ob-
19Actually, in (Kripke 1965b), Kripke presents a semantics for intuitionistic logic, completeness
and decision procedure for the propositional case, but undecidability of monadic quantification
logic is not established. It should have been treated in a sequel (Part II) (ibid. p. 92) but this has
never been written.
20It is disputedwhether these innovations reflect newphilosophical interpretation ofmodal oper-
ators ornot. Ballarin interprets thesenovelties as a technical innovation, so that «[t]here is absolutely
no sense in which it is natural to think of such model theoretic constructions (vis-à-vis the 1959 M-
models) as better suited to represent a non-semantic notion of metaphysical necessity» (Ballarin
2005, pp. 284-285).
21In his review, Kaplan adds to them A0: A, if A is a tautology (Kaplan 1966, p. 120). In (Kripke
1963b, p. 84), Kripke defines normal systems as in 1963, but adds A0: Truth-functional tautologies.
Furthermore, in (ibid.), he writes that «all systems considered contain all tautologies of classical
propositional logic as axiom; thus these axioms will not be listed explicitly» and adds that «[t]his
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tained by adding specific axioms (the so-called «reduction axioms» (ivi, p. 70)).
In a parenthesis, Kripke defines non-normal systems as not satisfying R2. The
propositional systems treated in 1963 areM,B, S4 and S5. It is worth noting that
Kripke’s basic normal system isM (or T) of Feys-von Wright (A1-A3 plus R1 and
R2)22 and notK, as in recent literature aboutmodal logics.23 Thus, given that ax-
iom T (A1) corresponds to the frame property of reflexivity, Kripke basic normal
modal system comes out as reflexive. System S4 is obtained by adding the axiom
scheme A4 ` A ⊃ A (now 4) toM. B corresponds toM supplemented by the
Brouwersche axiom ` A ⊃ ^A (now B).24 S5 is defined as in (Kripke 1959a): M
plus A2: ` ¬A ⊃ ¬A. Kripke also notices that S4 + B is equivalent to S5.
In §2 a normal model structure25 (n.m.s.) is defined as an ordered triple (G,
K, R), where K is a non-empty set, G ∈ K, and R is a reflexive relation defined on
K. As already anticipated, the presence of R is the novelty that permits Kripke
to deal with M, B and S4. Moreover, Kripke explicitly points out the reflexivity
of R for normal model structure, its transitivity for the S4-m.s., its symmetry for
Brouwesche-m.s. and its being an equivalence relation for S5-m.s. Then, a M
(S4, S5, B)model for a wff A of M (S4, S5, B) is obtained by giving a binary func-
tion φ(P, H) associated with the model structure, from P (atomic subformula of
A) and H (subset of K) to the set of truth values. The appearance of this evalua-
tion function is the second substantial novelty of 1963 semantics. The inductive
definition of φ(P, H) is standard for propositional connectives, while for modal
formulas it is: φ(B, H) = T iff φ(B, H’) = T for every H’ ∈ K such that HRH’. This
definition is a coherent extension of 1959 intuitive meaning of necessity. Fur-
thermore, consistently with (Kripke 1959a), a formula A is true in a model (G, K,
R, φ)26 if it is true in the actual world (i.e. φ(A, G) = T), otherwise it is false. A is
valid if it is true in all the models. A is satisfiable if true in, at least, one of them.
Similarly to (Kripke 1959a), after the presentation of the formal notions re-
quired for completeness proof (presented in §4), Kripke gives an informal mo-
tivation for its semantics (§2.1).27 Then, he considers the correspondence be-
proviso was inadvertently negated in (Kripke 1963a)».
22It was introduced in 1937 as ‘t’ by Feys, who obtained it by dropping 3 in (Gödel 1933), see
(Hughes and Cresswell 1966, 50, fn. 7). It was first called T in 1953 by Sobocinski, who also showed
its equivalence withM.
23The, now standard, name K was given to it by Lemmon and Scott in 1977, in honour of Kripke,
and it does not appear in any of Kripke’s paper, see (ibid., p. 49, fn. 1). Kripkemotivates the reflexivity
of his basic system as «an intuitively natural requirement» (Kripke 1963b, p. 84). However, at the end
of (Kripke 1963a, p. 95), he considers the possibility to drop it (T) in order to obtain a system for
deontic logic.
24The formula p ⊃ LMp appears in Becker (1930). The name of axiom (B) derives from Brouwer.
For further details, see (Hughes and Cresswell 1966, 70-71, fn. 5).
25Kripke never uses the word frame. It was employed for the first time in 1968 by Segerberg, ap-
parently under suggestion of Dana Scott. About this, see also (ibid. p. 50, fn. 3).
26Kripke never uses (G, K,R, φ) for model, but he writes «in amodel φ associated with am.s. (G, K,
R)» (Kripke 1963a, p. 69).
27In this sectionKripke himself presents the elements of continuity anddiscontinuitywith (Kripke
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tween the characteristic axiomof each systemand the relatedpropertyof R. First
of all, for each system, «[i]t is clear that everyworldH is possible relative to itself»
(Kripke 1963a, p. 70), so that not only he emphasizes, once again, the reflexivity
of basic normal system, but also presents the correspondence between M and
reflexive structure. Then, he shows (not extremely rigorously and straightfor-
wardly)28 the ones between, respectively, transitive structure and S4, symmetric
structure and B, and structure where R is an equivalence relation and S5.29
As for (Kripke 1959a), completeness30 is established by systematic searching
for a countermodel. In §3 Kripke, again, introduces the extended modal vari-
ant of Beth’s tableauxmethod. The rules forM in (Kripke 1963a) are very close to
1959 ones.31 As before, the falsification procedure for A1 & .. .& Am ⊃ B1 ∨ . . .∨Bn
assumes A1, . . . , Am to be true and B1, . . . , Bn to be false in the model, by putting
A1, . . . , Am to the left and B1, . . . , Bn to the right side of the main tableau. Then
rules are applied. No order of application is specified (although more rigorous,
Kripke considers it as superfluous). For systems B, S4 and S5, it is assumed that
the relation R is (respectively) symmetric, transitive or both. However, Kripke
does not treat these rules as formal part of the syntax in tableaux construction
(Negri 2009, p. 243).32 A countermodel for a formula A is then searchedby apply-
ing the given construction to a main tableau where A is put on the right side. If
no countermodel exists, the formula is valid. Still a tableau is closed iff a formula
appears on both sides (there is no identity in 1963 language); a set of tableaux is
closed iff some tableau in it is and a system is closed iff each of its alternative sets
is. The continuity between 1959 and 1963 articles is evident. The presentation
of the method is followed by some examples of S4 and S5-tabelau construction
procedure (§3.1).
In §3.2 Kripke proves the completeness of tableau procedure with respect to
1959a). Kripke defines relational semantics as a generalization of 1959 one, fromwhich it differs for
the auxiliary function φ and for the appearance of R, whose informal interpretation is given: H1RH2
expresses that H2 is possible relative to H1 or H2 is related to H1. The «“absolute” notion of possible
world» for S5, is replaced by a «relative notion» (Kripke 1963a, p. 70) (see also (Kripke 1963b, p. 84)).
The definition of necessity (and possibility) of A in a world also changes.
28The overall strategy to prove correspondence between a frame property and an axiom is to as-
sume the validity of the axiom in the frame, and to show that this frame has the correspondent prop-
erty. For example, given the Brouwersche axiom B, A ⊃ ^A, and the fact that for an arbitrary H1,
H1RH2 holds, Kripke proves H2RH1, so that the structure is symmetric.
29As an alternative, he proposes to simply abandon R and to use the model structure (G, K).
30In (Kripke 1963a, 69, fn. 2), Kripke presents a “status questionis” concerning completeness
proof, showing his awareness about previous results and underlying the independence of his dis-
coveries.
31Due to the presence of the reflexive relation R, the rules ∧r (the one which splits) and the two
modal rules change, see respectively (Kripke 1959a, p. 4) and (Kripke 1963a). Of course, proposi-
tional 1963 rules do not include∏l,∏r, Il and Ir.
32Kripke himself is aware that his presentation lacks in formal clearance. Indeed, in describing ∧r
hewrites: «I hope this explanationmakes the process clear intuitively; the formal statement is rather
messy» (ibid., p. 73). See also (Kaplan 1966) critique.
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the semantics (for the four propositional systems, a construction for A is closed
iff A is valid). This corresponds to 1959 Theorem 1, where semantically entail-
ment substitutes the notion of A-validity.33 The completeness theorem is de-
veloped in §4: A is provable inM, B, S4 or S5 iff it is true in the corresponding
model. In §4.1, validity is proved: every provable formula is valid in the specific
system. Kripke defines this constructive proof as an «easymechanical task», ob-
tained by simply verifying that every axiom is valid for the appropriate theory,
and that the rules preserve validity. Then, in §4.2, completeness for each system
is established.34 In §5.1 Kripke proves decidability forM and B and for S4 and
S5 in, respectively, analogous ways. In §6, Kripke announces future extension of
the semantical analysis to non-normal logic and quantification theory.
The legacy of these results is enormous. However, even if Kripke’s papers
pave the way to a rigorous analysis of modal logic, themost widespread presen-
tation ofmodal completeness theorems is usually not the original one, based on
tableaux method. Indeed, in his 1966 review, Kaplan judges 1959 proof as not
clear enough. He alternatively proposes a sketch of a Henkin-style proof, con-
sidered «more rigorous» (Kaplan 1966, p. 121) since it avoids tableau technique
and does not require any reader’s geometrical intuition. Kaplan attributes the
idea to Dana Scott. Actually, the first Henkin-style completeness proof for S5
appeared is 1958 Bayart’s paper.35 Later, completeness proofs for variousmodal
systems appear inMakinson (1966) and in Cresswell (1967). Despite the success
of Kaplan’s suggestion and the general adoption of Henkin’s technique, Negri
emphasizes that it hides some information that are instead explicit in Kripke’s
original proof (Negri 2009). Indeed, elegant Henkin’s proof is based on a “trick”
and it does not show how to obtain a countermodel for underivable proposi-
tions. So, Kripke’s proof is more informative. In order to overcome both the lack
of data in Henkin’s proof and the lack of clearance in Kripke’s one, Negri pro-
poses the introduction of a labelled sequent calculus which permits a direct and
rigorous completeness proof.36
33Kripke himself considers 1963 Lemma 1 and 2 corresponds to 1959 homonymous. Lemma 1 es-
tablishes validity. As for (Kripke 1959a), the proof is a reductio ad absurdum. Lemma 2 demonstrates
completeness, by contraposition (and employs König’sUnendlichkeitslemma is quoted). See, (Negri
2009).
34Obtained in §3.2 the completeness of tableau procedure with respect to the semantics, he has
to simply show that «if the construction for A is closed, then A is provable in the appropriate system»
(Kripke 1963a, p. 82). He employs Lemma: If A0 is the characteristic formula of the initial stage of
a construction, and B0 is the characteristic formula of any stage, then `A0 ⊃ B0 (analogous to 1959
Lemma 4).
35It is striking that Bayart himself, in his review to (Kripke 1959a) does notmention his alternative
approach for establishing S5* completeness, see (Bayart 1966b).
36In (Negri 2009), the labelled calculus is given through internalization of possible-worlds seman-
tics within the syntax. Modal systems stronger than K are obtained by adding to G3K rules corre-
sponding to the characteristic properties of the desired systems. This approach, which makes the
accessibility relation an explicit part of the syntax and not an implicit property of the tree, simplifies
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
9:2
(2018)
72
Melissa Antonelli Kripke’s Modal Logic: A Historical Study
5 SemanticalConsiderationsonModalandIntuition-
istic Logic (1963)
Kripke completes his formal analysis of normal modal logics in (Kripke 1963b)
by considering quantifiedM, B, S4 and S5. Despite some changes inmodel the-
ory, the continuitywith previous articles into a unifiedproject is again evident.37
Moreover, future treatment of non-normal ones is announced. First of all, previ-
ous definitions and results for normalM and its extensions (definition of model
structure and completeness theorem) are summed up. Then, from p. 84 on,
Kripke introduces quantifiers by defining a quantificational model structure (G,
K, R) and a function ψ, which assigns to each H ∈ K a set ψ(H) of all individu-
als existing in H, called the domain of H. ψ(H) needs not to be the same set for
different Hs: intuitively, Pegasus does not exist in the real world butmay appear
in some other. This rises the problem of if and which truth-value to assign to
φ(P(x), H) when x exists in the domain of some world H’ but not in the one of
H (Kripkean example is Sherlock Holmes). After comparing different historical
proposals of solution to this (Frege-StrawsonandRussell), Kripke concludes that
«[f]or the purposes of modal logic we hold that different answers to this ques-
tion represent alternative conventions. All are tenable» (ivi, pp. 85-86). Kripke
opts for the (bivalent) solution «that a statement containing free variables has a
truth-value in each world for every assignment to its free variables» (ibid.). Dif-
ferently from previous works, where the content is mainly formal, here the link
with general issues in philosophy of language emerges. Kripke also shows that
with 1963 semantics the Barcan formula and its converse are not S5*-valid.
The article concludes with some brief remarks on the “provability” interpre-
tations for propositional modal logics: «Provability interpretations are based on
a desire to adjoin a necessity operator to a formal system, say Peano arithmetic,
in such away that, for any formula A of the system, Awill be interpreted as true
iff A is provable in the system» (ivi, p. 90). Thus, φ(P, F) = T iff P is provable in
PA. Kripke also deals with the mapping of intuitionistic logic into S4 in order to
get amodel theory for intuitionistic predicate calculus, without giving its model
theory and confining the study to propositional calculus. However, some cen-
tral elements of (Kripke 1965a) are anticipated: ¬A is verified in E iff there is no
consistent extension of E verifying A; A ⊃ B is verified in E iff every consistent
extension E’ of E verifying A also verifies B.
Kripke’s tableau method. For further details about completeness proof and modal proof theory, see
at least (Negri 2005, pp. 312-319), (Negri and von Plato 2001, pp. 81-86) and (Negri 2011).
37Apart from explicit and various references to them, the arrangement of the paper is analogous
to the former ones (excluded completeness proofs, which are mostly suppressed).
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6 Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I (1965)
(Kripke 1965b) published in 1965 (but presented in 1963) does not directly con-
cern modal logics but it is still strictly connected with it and to previously men-
tioned results. Indeed, Kripke writes that «the semantics for modal logic which
we announced in (Kripke 1959b) and developed in (Kripke 1963a) and (Kripke
1963b), together with the known mapping of intuitionistic logic into the modal
system S4, inspired the present semantics for intuitionistic logic» (ivi, p. 92).
In §1 intuitionistic semantics is presented. An intuitionistic model structure
is an ordered triple (G, K, R), with R reflexive and transitive. Kripke adds to the
usual definition a condition to be satisfied: if φ(P, H) = T and HRH’, then φ(P,
H’) = T (H, H’ ∈ K). The truth-value of a formula in a world (H) is defined in the
standard way for & and ∨, while for negation and implication, it is: φ(A ⊃ B, H)
= T iff for all H’ ⊃ K such that HRH’, φ(A, H’) = F or φ(B, H’) = T; φ(¬A, H) = T
iff for all H’ ∈ K such that HRH’, φ(A, H’) = F. Then, the usual notion of validity
and quantificational model are presented. Kripke explicates that G has to be
interpreted as the “evidential situation”. Given H to be any situation, we have
HRH’ if, as far as we know at the timeH, wemay later get enough information to
advance to H’. Thus, «[t]he requirement that, for any A, if φ(A, H) = T and HRH’,
then φ(A,H’) =T simplymeans that ifwe alreadyhave eproof of A in the situation
H, thenwe can accept A as proved in any later situationH’» (Kripke 1965b, p. 99).
The interpretation of the connectives in intuitionistic semantics is explained as
well: «To assert ¬A intuitionistically in the situationH, we need to know at H not
only that A has not been verified at H, but that it cannot possibly be verified at
any later time, no matter how much more information is gained [. . . ] Again, to
assert A ⊃ B in a situationH,we need to know that in any later situationH’where
we get a proof of A, we also get a proof of B» (ibid.).
After presenting tableaux method for intuitionistic logic (§2), validity (§3.1)
and completeness are establishedbyBeth’smethod (§3.2).38 Results concerning
decidability (decision procedure for propositional intuitionistic logic and unde-
cidability of monadic quantification theory) should have appeared in a sequel,
Part II, but this has never been published.
38The analogy with 1963 proof is evident. The proof of Theorem 2 (the completeness of tableau
procedure) is just sketched because it is «a routine variation of the proofs of the corresponding the-
orems in (Kripke 1963a) [Lemma 1 and 2]». Validity (Theorem 3) is the same «trivial» (Kripke 1965b,
p. 214) task, as the analogous «mechanical» (Kripke 1963a, p. 82) proof presented in §4.1 two years
before. Also completeness proof (Theorem 4) is defined as similar to 1963 one.
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7 SemanticalAnalysisofModalLogic II.Non-normal
Modal Propositional Calculi (1965)
Kripke also introduced a special kind of worlds, dubbed non-normal worlds, in
order to provide a semantics for modal logics weaker than the basic K (called
“non-normal” in their turn), such as C.I. Lewis S2 and S3. Specifically, the non-
normal modal systems at issue do not include the rule of necessitation: if `A,
then ` A (Kripke 1963a, p. 67). For this reason, to Kripke they appear to be «in-
tuitively somewhat unnatural» (ivi, p. 206). Nevertheless, he considers useful to
propose an «elegant model theory» (ibid.) for them, where non-normal worlds
appears to be technical devices to make necessitation fail (Berto 2013).
Their treatment in (Kripke 1965a) requires acquaintance of (Kripke 1963a) is
presupposed.39 In §2, Kripke defines somenon-normal propositional systems40
and, in §3, their semantics. He starts showing that in E2, E3 no formula of the
form B is provable, not even (A ⊃ A) (although A ⊃ A is true in every world).
Moreover, in E2, ` B ⊃ (A ⊃ A). Consequently ` ¬(A ⊃ A) ⊃ ¬B. Thus, if
A ⊃ A is not necessary, nothing is. This leads Kripke to divide possible worlds
in two classes: “normal worlds”, where necessity is evaluated according to 1963
semantics, and “non-normalworlds”, whereB is always false. Then, (E2)model
structure is defined as a quadruple (G, K, R, N), where K is the set of worlds, G
∈ K, N ⊂ K, and R is reflexive on N. N represents the set of normal worlds.41 A
model is obtained by associating a valuation function φ(P, H) to the frame. φ(A,
H) is inductively defined as in 1963 for propositional connectives (&, ¬), but it
changes for modal formulas. Indeed, a modal formula is true in a normal world
if it results necessary in it in the usual sense (otherwise it is false), but it is always
false in non-normal worlds. Again, a formula A is true in a model (G, K, R, N, φ)
iff φ(A, G) = T and A is valid iff it is true in every model. Differently from (Kripke
1963a), the distinguished G plays here an essential role in the definitions.42
39Kripke writes that (Kripke 1965a) «continues the investigations of (Kripke 1963a)» and that it
«extends the results of (ibid.) to these and other systems. The results of this paper were announced
in (ibid.), (Kripke 1959b)» (ibid., p. 206). Titles himself emphasize the continuity between these two
works.
40Lemmon E2 is characterized by axioms A1 (T) and A3 (K) and rules R1 and (Eb) If `A ⊃ B, then
` A ⊃ B (Lemmon presents, in 1957, the first “Gödel-style” formulation of non-normal S1-S3 and
introduces E1-E5 as the “epistemic” counterparts of S1-S5). E3 is obtained from E2 by replacing A3
with stronger (1) (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B). E4 consists of axioms A1, A3 and A4 (4) and rules R1 and
(Eb). The re-defined E5 is constituted by A1, A3 and A2, i.e. A ⊃ (¬B ⊃  ¬B) and rules R1 and
(Eb) (original E5 collapses into S5). Łukasiewicz Ł-modal system is axiomatized by A1, (4), i.e. (A ⊃
B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B), plus R1.
41E3-m.s. are obtained when R is transitive; S2 (S3)-m.s. are E2 (E3) where G is normal.
42Indeed, for example,(A ⊃ A) is valid in S2 (whereG is normal), because φ((A ⊃ A),G) = T. Then,
in §3 and §4 Kripke presents tableaux method and semantical rules for non-normal propositional
logics, in§5 completeness theoremand in§7 (according to (Makinson1970), somehow inaccurately)
other non-normal modal systems widespread in literature.
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